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On the basis of relative strengths that have been attributed to the autistic cognitive
profile, it has been suggested by a number of theorists that people with autism spectrum
disorders (ASD) excel at spatial navigational tasks. However, many of these claims
have been made in the absence of a close inspection of extant data in the scientific
literature, let alone anecdotal reports of daily navigational experiences. The present review
gathers together published studies that have attempted to explicitly address functional
components of navigation in ASD populations, including assays of wayfinding, large-scale
search, and path integration. This inspection reveals a pattern of apparent strengths and
weaknesses in navigational abilities, thus illustrating the necessity for a more measured
and comprehensive approach to the understanding of spatial behavior in ASD.
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INTRODUCTION
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental con-
dition that is identified by difficulties with social communica-
tion and a restricted range of behavioral patterns and interests
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Although the condi-
tion is characterized by these behavioral manifestations, ASD
is increasingly described in the scientific literature with specific
reference to perceptual and cognitive mechanisms (for a review,
see Rajendran and Mitchell, 2007). Those that have received the
most theoretical attention are a preference for processing local
detail (Weak Central Coherence; Frith and Happé, 1994), diffi-
culty understanding the perspective of others (Theory of Mind;
Baron-Cohen, 1989), and impairments of executive tasks such as
planning and inhibition (Executive Dysfunction; Ozonoff et al.,
1991).
Compared to the study of other developmental conditions,
it is a notable idiosyncrasy of autism research that some of the
behavioral factors associated with ASD have been described as a
relative strength of the cognitive profile. So, for example, whilst
behaviors linked to weak central coherence may not necessarily
favor an appreciation of the Gestalt, they might also result in
superior detection of local details, compared to typically devel-
oping (TD) participants (Shah and Frith, 1983, 1993). Indeed,
it is generally within the visuospatial domain that people with
ASD have been shown to excel, and previous cohort studies have
reported group effects that include increased efficiency in visual
search, superior perception of slant, and a resistance to visual
illusions (for a particularly thorough review and discussion of
these findings and others see; Simmons et al., 2009). Such patterns
have led Mottron and Burack (2001) and Mottron et al. (2006) to
develop the theory of Enhanced Perceptual Functioning, which
offers a neural explanation for peaks in performance across low-
level perceptual tasks.
The framing of behaviors as relative strengths has since
affected the way in which theorists discuss many aspects of autistic
performance. This has been particularly apparent when it comes
to discussions of spatial navigation, and there have been a number
of claims that the strengths observed in small-scale laboratory
tasks extend to large-scale everyday wayfinding. Some arguments
have been made relatively incidentally, whereas others have been
posited in specific treatises. An example of the former comes from
Baron-Cohen (2008) who, when discussing his Hypersystemising
theory of ASD, stated that strong systemisers “would have had
greater success in both using and making tools for hunting, or
navigating space to explore far afield” (p. 67). This argument is
couched in evolutionary terms: proficiency in spatial tasks, and
in understanding rule-based systems, is adaptive and thus would
have conferred benefits upon our ancestors. However, Baron-
Cohen (2008) does not expand upon this point, and we may
therefore take it as an example of the potential breadth of the
Hypersystemising account. In comparison, however, Reser (2011)
very explicitly argues that the genes associated with ASD have
been selected for, precisely because the condition confers a specific
advantage for navigating large-scale environments. The “Solitary
Forager Hypothesis” states that the autistic behavioral profile is
ideal for foraging in the ancestral environment—preoccupations
would be focused on the procurement of food, asocial tendencies
would foster a desire to independently explore further afield, and
an engagement in repetitive activities would be well suited to
scanning the environment and picking up food.
Neither of the above accounts presents any empirical evidence
for their claims that autistic individuals are good navigators,
and yet it is not difficult to appreciate why one might reach
such a conclusion: ASD is indeed associated with peaks in some
visuospatial tasks, and systemising behaviors could conceivably
lend themselves to an efficient analysis of regularities or changes
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in the surrounding environment. However, there are two core
problems with this position. First, many anecdotal reports from
people with ASD and their carers actually attest to a difficulty
with daily navigation, and there are myriad accounts on internet
forums of people with ASD being unable to find where they
parked their car, or becoming lost in their home town because a
familiar route was blocked. Not only do these difficulties affect the
quality of everyday life, but they are also often the cause of anxiety,
frustration, and embarrassment. The second key issue is that the
extant scientific literature on navigation in ASD does not present
a uniform picture of navigational prowess. Instead, there appear
to be some components of navigational behavior in which people
with ASD perform similarly to matched controls, some in which
they appear to show a relative strength, and others in which they
demonstrate a notable weakness. It is this literature that I explore
in the present review, in the hope of producing a more accurate
overview of current knowledge, and one that is firmly based upon
empirical enquiry.
Spatial navigation is a complex behavior that is subject to great
individual differences across typical and atypically developing
people (Wolbers and Hegarty, 2010). Such differences result from
the fact that effective navigation relies on a wide variety of pro-
cesses, from moment-to-moment idiothetic (i.e., self-movement
information) coding of positional change to enduring long-
term representations of places and their configural relationships
(e.g., Siegel and White, 1975; Golledge et al., 1985; Aguirre and
D’Esposito, 1999; Hegarty et al., 2006). As a result, it is not
surprising that there has been no comprehensive investigation of
autistic navigation across all of these factors. However, although
small, the current literature on navigation in ASD does cover a
variety of skills, including path integration, large-scale search, and
map utilization. In this review I have restricted inclusion only to
published studies that have explicitly tested one or more of these
factors in adults and children with ASD. This, therefore, does not
include rodent models of autistic navigation (e.g., Crawley, 2007;
Moy et al., 2007), nor does it include studies of autistic behavior
on small-scale tasks that could arguably be related to large-scale
navigational performance (e.g., Caron et al., 2006; Steele et al.,
2007). Of the studies reviewed here, some were explicitly designed
to test components of navigation, whereas others included naviga-
tional tasks within a more general exploration of spatial behavior.
As a result, there are bound to be other examples in the literature
that have evaded search owing to the fact that they were not
intended to be studies of navigation per se.
PATH INTEGRATION
Path integration is the process by which humans and non-human
animals update their sense of position by use of idiothetic infor-
mation, derived from labyrinthine and musculoskeletal sources.
This process has been widely studied in adults (for a review,
see Loomis et al., 1999), although much less so in development
(Rieser and Pick, 2007; Smith et al., 2013). One component of
path integration behavior is the ability to walk without vision to
a previously-seen target location, and a study by Giovannini et al.
(2009) explored this in a sample of children with ASD. The main
theoretical drive of their study was to assess the dissociability of
vision-for-locomotion and vision-for-perception in development,
and Experiment 2 of their study included an autistic sample on
the basis that a localist bias may give rise to an atypical profile
(although there were no clear predictions about how this might
be manifest in behavior).
Fifteen high-functioning children with ASD (mean age:
10 years) were compared to 18 TD children (mean age: 7 years),
who were matched on performance IQ (PIQ) by use of Raven’s
Colored Progressive Matrices (RCPM; Raven et al., 1962). An
additional group of 10 adults without ASD was recruited for
comparison with both developmental samples, and all partici-
pants completed two tasks. In the first, designed to assess vision-
for-locomotion, participants were blindfolded and placed at a
fixed starting position in a large indoor space. A target (orange
cardboard disk) was then placed somewhere between 3 and 6 m
from the participants, and the blindfold was removed for 3 s.
The blindfold was then replaced and participants were asked
to walk to where they remembered the target (which had since
been removed) being positioned. Participants produced only one
response. Their landing positions were converted into propor-
tional signed errors and compared between groups—here there
was found to be no statistical difference between any of the
groups, with error being close to 0 for each of them. However,
inspection of the figure provided by the authors does suggest that,
on the whole, participants with ASD were a little more likely to
undershoot the target location than the other groups.
In the second task, designed to assess vision-for-perception,
participants were seated and asked to look at the target disk, which
was again placed 3–6 m away from them. A rope was laid on
the floor, reaching from the chair to the target, and participants
were asked to adjust a similar rope (i.e., a tape measure that was
gradually lengthened by an experimenter) until its length matched
that of the first rope. This second rope was oriented orthogonally
to the first, so that participants were adjusting the horizontal
arm of an L-shape so that it matched the vertical arm. Again,
participants only performed one trial of this task, and responses
were also converted into a proportional signed error. In this task,
children with ASD were significantly more accurate than both
adults and TD children, who both tended to undershoot the target
length (whereas ASD responses were close to 0). Errors across the
two tasks did not correlate across participants, and RCPM did not
predict children’s performance on either measure once age had
been controlled for.
These data suggest that there is no difference between children
with ASD and TD adults or children on a locomotion task that
partly relies upon path integration processes. This may therefore
mean that people with ASD are able to use vision-for-locomotion
in the same way as TD people, and may also use idiothetic infor-
mation to update location just as readily as TD participants. With
regards to vision-for-perception, the Giovannini et al. (2009) data
provide an interesting large-scale addition to the literature that
demonstrates greater accuracy in ASD participants on some per-
ceptual tasks. This may be a result of a localist bias in participants,
which has been argued to render them “immune” from illusory
scaling errors in horizontal/vertical matching tasks (see Happé,
1996; Ropar and Mitchell, 1999). Together, these findings argue
for a dissociation between visual processes (i.e., perception vs.
action), although our conclusions on ASD performance must be
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limited by the fact that participants only produced one response
on either measure, and the parameters of the tasks were not sys-
tematically manipulated. Furthermore, one cannot extend these
findings to path integration proper until a more rigorous assay has
been employed, such as the triangle-completion task (see Smith
et al., 2013).
LARGE-SCALE SEARCH
Laboratory studies of visual search behavior have previously
demonstrated greater efficiency in ASD groups on certain compo-
nents of the task (e.g., O’Riordan et al., 2001; Jarrold et al., 2005).
Pellicano et al. (2011) assessed whether this strength extends to
large-scale navigational search behavior—i.e., a foraging task that
utilized full body movements in 3D space, as opposed to eye
movements directed to 2D stimuli on a monitor. They devised a
task in which participants were required to search for a hidden
target item by inspecting a number of potential locations. In
this case, the location of the hidden target was probabilistically
determined such that it was more likely to appear on one half
of the display. Since the Hypersystemising account of ASD (see
Baron-Cohen, 2008) highlights that people with the condition
are more likely to systematically test different hypotheses, and
will therefore more readily derive systems and patterns in the
world around them, it was predicted that people with ASD would
be more likely to learn the probabilistic cue and search more
efficiently over time.
Twenty children with ASD (mean age: 10 years) were com-
pared to a group of twenty TD children who were matched on
chronological age, verbal IQ (VIQ, as measured by the British
Picture Vocabulary Scale—BPVS; Dunn and Dunn, 2009) and
PIQ (measured using RCPM). The experiment was conducted
in a 4 m × 4 m chamber containing a raised platform floor.
Embedded into the floor was a concentric array of 49 circular
switches, each surrounded by an annulus of light-emitting diodes.
The laboratory was dimly lit and surrounded by dark featureless
curtains, thus removing any obvious landmarks other than the
search locations. In a trial, 16 search locations were illuminated
(green), with eight locations either side of the midline. This
array was randomized for each participant and remained fixed
throughout the experiment. Participants began their search at a
fixed starting point at the edge on the array, on the midline, and
were required to press the switch at each location until they had
found the target (the light that turned from green to red when
the switch was activated). There were 40 search trials, organized
in two blocks of 20, and the target appeared on one side of the
midline for 80% of the trials (equally across blocks). Children
were instructed that the target was always present and that they
were to find it as quickly as possible, but there was no mention of
the uneven distribution.
In order to ascertain whether children with ASD demonstrated
greater sensitivity to the probability cue, Pellicano et al. (2011)
compared the density of inspections that were directed to the
cued and uncued hemifields. They found that TD children were
more likely than ASD children to search in the cued hemifield in
the first block, although there was no difference between groups
for block 2. This suggested that children with ASD were, in fact,
taking longer to infer the rule than TD children. The authors
also modeled the quality of the search patterns taken by children,
deriving indices of both optimality (i.e., taking the shortest path
to the target whilst inspecting all intervening locations) and
systematicity (i.e., the consistency of search paths, irrespective of
target location). On both of these measures, children with ASD
were found to perform statistically lower than TD children—that
is, their search paths were less optimal and less systematic. It was
also found that children with ASD made reliably more revisits to
previously-inspected locations than TD children, which may have
been an index of poorer spatial memory, or a product of sub-
optimal search paths. Interestingly, it was found that this revisit
behavior was predicted by performance on other tasks: children
with poorer visuo-spatial working memory (as measured by Corsi
blocks) made more revisits, as did children with greater efficiency
on an attention-to-detail task (the Children’s Embedded Figures
Test; Witkin, 1971).
The results of the Pellicano et al. (2011) study suggest that
the strengths that have been observed in small-scale search tasks
do not necessarily extend to large-scale search behavior. Indeed,
contrary to expectations, children with ASD were found to be
less efficient at the task than TD participants. Furthermore, the
predictions of the Hypersystemising theory were not met, as
children with ASD explored the space in a manner that was
less systematic than their TD counterparts. The fact that search
efficiency was related to visuospatial working memory does point
to a factor that could underlie these differences. Furthermore, a
similar relationship with embedded figures performance suggests
that configural processing may also play a part in tasks such as this
(i.e., children may be less likely to assign probabilistic weight to a
half of the array if the array itself has not been strongly configured
into a whole). It is also interesting to note that a recent study of
probability cueing in visual search found that children with ASD
were as sensitive to cues as TD children (Jiang et al., 2013), which
suggests that spatial learning does not necessarily operate in the
same manner across scales (see Smith et al., 2010).
VIRTUAL WAYFINDING
Perhaps the most widely used paradigm in modern navigational
research is virtual wayfinding, where participants are required
to learn a novel 3D environment that is presented via computer
software. The great advantage of this technique is that it affords
scientists a great deal of control over the environments that
they present. Thus, one can present very simple spaces (such
as a virtual Morris Maze), or much more detailed naturalistic
contexts, without the difficulties that can be associated with real-
world testing. In line with this range of potentials, some scientists
have used virtual wayfinding tasks to study discrete components
of place learning in ASD, whereas others have used them to study
more complex components of everyday urban navigation.
An example of the former study comes from Edgin and Pen-
nington (2005), who explored the profile of spatial cognition
with reference to central coherence and executive function the-
ories of ASD. Twenty-four high functioning children with ASD
(mean age: 11 years) were compared to a group of TD children
matched on chronological age, VIQ (measured by the Peabody
Picture Vocabulary Test; Dunn et al., 1965) and PIQ (measured
by the Block Design task from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale
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for Children; Wechsler, 1974). They presented participants with
a battery of tasks that mostly consisted of small-scale measures,
such as the embedded figures test, and a spatial working memory
test. However, it also included a virtual navigation task in the form
of a computerized Morris Water Maze. In this experiment, based
on a classic test of rodent navigation, children were required to
learn and remember a hidden spatial location. Using a joystick,
children navigated themselves around a circular arena, which was
oriented by extra-maze cues in the form of a square chamber
beyond the circular boundary, with distinguishing markers on
each of the walls. A blue rug was visible on the floor and children
were first required to navigate to that rug for a number of
acquisition trials. They were then told that the rug had become
invisible, and that they must search the arena to find it. There
were five probe trials, each beginning from a different point
around the circumference of the maze, and once the child had
moved to the location containing the rug it became visible to
them. The authors measured the amount of time that children
spent searching in the correct quadrant of the maze, a measure of
successful place learning, and found no group difference between
ASD and TD children. However, they did find that there was
no relationship between ASD performance and chronological
age, whereas older TD children demonstrated improved spatial
learning compared to younger TD children. This suggests that the
rate of development for this behavior is slower in ASD; although,
as noted by the authors, such a conclusion must be limited by
the relatively restricted age range tested. Edgin and Pennington
(2005) did find a difference in embedded figures performance,
in line with previous demonstrations of more efficient behavior
in participants with ASD, but not in any of their other spatial
measures, suggesting that children with ASD were not generally
superior across the domain of spatial behaviors tested.
Lind et al. (2013) used a more complex virtual environment to
measure the navigational skills of a sample of adults with ASD.
Some theorists have highlighted the role of episodic memory
in efficient navigation (e.g., Hassabis et al., 2007; Spiers and
Maguire, 2008), whereas others have favored an explanation that
places the ability to appreciate alternative perspectives at the
heart of navigation (Buckner and Carroll, 2007). Since these are
both processes that have been shown to be impaired in people
with ASD, Lind et al. (2013) predicted that performance in a
navigational task that is based upon survey knowledge (i.e., an
allocentric viewer-independent representation) would be poorer
in participants with autism. This, in turn, would be counter to
the predictions of the Hypersystemising theory of ASD. Twenty-
seven high-functioning adults with ASD (mean age: 35 years)
were tested alongside a group of neurotypical adults matched on
chronological age, VIQ, PIQ, and full-scale IQ (all measured using
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; Wechsler, 1999).
Participants completed the Memory Island task, whereupon they
used a joystick to explore a richly-textured virtual island in
search of a “mysterious object.” The island contained a variety of
naturalistic landmarks (as well as audio content) and participants
began each trial in its centre (although facing different directs).
In the first phase of the experiment, the locations of four objects
(one per trial) were clearly marked by flags, and participants
were asked to navigate to the flag in order to locate the object.
Once they had located it, they were instructed to remember its
location. This phase relied upon basic locomotor guidance in
order to find the object, but also required participants to construct
a cognitive map for the environment in order to remember the
object locations. The quality of this representation was assessed in
the second phase, where participants were instructed to navigate
to each of the objects (one per trial) without the presence of the
flag markers.
The authors took a number of dependent measures, including
the proportion of time spent in the correct quadrant of the island,
trials latency, movement velocity, path length, and the proportion
of trials in which the object was located within 2 min (after
which assistance was provided). They found that participants
with ASD spent significantly less time in the correct quadrant
when the target was hidden, compared to when it was signified
by a flag. In comparison, typical adults spent an equal amount
of time in the correct area in both phases. Lind et al. (2013)
also found significant group differences in other measures, with
ASD participants demonstrating longer latencies, slower velocity,
and fewer successful trials. Critically, these differences occurred
in both phases of the task, indicating a general diminishment of
navigational efficiency in the ASD group, irrespective of whether
they were locomoting toward a beacon or navigating on the basis
of a cognitive map. The performance of both groups was related
to scores on other measures of episodic memory and Theory of
Mind, although there were no meaningful differences between
groups in terms of these associations. Overall, these findings
therefore contrasted with those of Edgin and Pennington (2005)
by showing that participants with ASD performed reliably poorer
than control participants—they were generally less efficient, but
were also exploring incorrect parts of the island when searching
for target locations.
A somewhat similar task was employed by Fornasari et al.
(2013) in a study of urban wayfinding. They compared a group
of 16 high-functioning children with ASD (mean age: 10 years)
to a TD control group matched on chronological age, race, sex,
language and educational level. Groups were not matched on
measures of VIQ or PIQ, and the authors went on to examine
participants on a battery of performance measures (e.g., RCPM,
block construction, figure copying). This included the Route
Finding component of the of the NEPSY-II battery (Korkman
et al., 2007), where children are shown a schematic map contain-
ing a house and are then required to locate the house within a
larger map (containing other houses and streets). Children with
ASD performed poorer than their TD counterparts on all of
these measures, demonstrating lower PIQ and relatively impaired
visuospatial abilities. The authors then compared groups on a
virtual wayfinding task, where children used a mouse to control
exploration around an unfamiliar urban environment. After a
familiarization stage (in a simple courtyard space) children were
presented with a small town environment, consisting of streets
and buildings that formed 11 different zones. There were two
phases to the task, and in the first children were asked to freely
explore the town until they thought that they had seen it in its
entirety. In the second phase, the children were shown an object
and told that there were five of them to search for throughout the
town. Children then performed this “treasure hunt” and clicked
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on each of the objects when they had been located—an onscreen
running total reminded them of how many remained.
Fornasari et al. (2013) took a number of dependent measures
of exploration in both phases, including the number of different
zones visited, the number of revisits to locations already explored,
and properties of the exploration movements (e.g., path length,
time spent stationary, or moving). These data were analyzed with
RCPM as a covariate, in order to control for any influence of
PIQ, and there was found to be no effect of RCPM score on any
of the measures. There were, however, significant group effects
in the “free exploration” phase of the experiment: children with
ASD visited fewer zones of the town and also spent less time
moving around the environment. There were, however, no dif-
ferences between groups in the “treasure hunt” task. The authors
also performed correlational analyses between the exploration
measures and the battery of clinical tasks that were administered
to children. In the ASD group, stronger autistic tendencies (as
measured by Achenbach’s Child Behavior Checklist; Achenbach
and Edelbrock, 1983) were related to greater time spent revisiting
areas that had already been explored, along with longer con-
comitant path lengths. The “treasure hunt” phase also revealed
a negative relationship between the NEPSY-II Route Finding test
and the time spent stationary in the virtual environment. There
were no relationships between any of the variables in the TD
group. These data therefore suggest that children with ASD spend
less time actively exploring an environment, and may also re-visit
those places that they have explored in a restricted and repetitive
manner.
REAL-WORLD EXPLORATION
It is clear from the virtual navigation studies detailed above that
participants with ASD are often less likely to explore the exper-
imental space as extensively as TD participants. Interestingly,
this does not necessarily appear to be a phenomenon that is
restricted to virtual environments, and there have been studies
that also report a reduction of exploratory behavior in real-
world 3D environments. Critically, this is a different behavior to
that which was described in the large-scale search section of this
review—exploration studies tend to be entirely unconstrained
by task, and participants are simply ask to “play” in a space. It
is therefore arguable whether tests of exploration are addressing
navigational behaviors per se, although a willingness to explore
the surrounding environment is clearly a prerequisite to effective
navigation, and other theorists have also found this work useful
in their thinking about large-scale spatial behavior in ASD.
Pierce and Courchesne (2001) studied the role of the cere-
bellum in exploratory behavior and recruited 14 children (aged
between 2 and 8 years) with ASD. These participants were com-
pared to a sample matched only by chronological age—since the
authors were primarily concerned with neuroanatomical analyses,
they did not seek to match according to ability. In their behavioral
task, children were taken to a testing room that contained a
number of different containers. In some of these containers were
a variety of novel objects, placed so that some were visible to the
child from afar and would motivate exploration and inspection.
Children were simply asked by the experimenter to “go and
play,” and their exploration was recorded. The authors analyzed
a number of behavioral measures, including duration of explo-
ration, number of locations explored, and the nature and quantity
of motor activity. They found that children with ASD spent
significantly less time exploring than controls, and also visited
fewer containers. Both of these factors positively correlated with
cerebellar abnormality in the ASD sample, although there was no
such correlation in the TD children. Overall levels of activity did
not differ notably between groups, although ASD children were
more likely to engage in repetitive behaviors, and this was found
to be related to cerebellar and frontal lobe volume. Data from this
study therefore suggest that neural atypicalities associated with
ASD may have a direct effect on the likelihood on individuals
engaging with exploratory behavior.
It is possible, however, that additional factors may have limited
exploration in ASD in the Pierce and Courchesne (2001) study,
including how visually salient the items were. This was addressed
in greater depth by Kawa and Pisula (2010), who studied the
relationship between the features of objects and the exploratory
behavior of children with ASD and children with Down syn-
drome. Nine participants with ASD (mean age: 4 years) were
compared to nine children with Down syndrome and nine TD
participants, matched only on chronological age. Children were
introduced to a room that contained three experimental zones—
each consisted of an identical layout of objects, although the visual
complexity of each object (i.e., color and additional detail) was
manipulated between zones. Children were simply asked to “go
play” and their behavior was recorded and coded to measure
exploratory activity and interaction with objects. The authors
found that TD children looked at the objects more than both
the ASD and Down syndrome groups (who did not differ on this
measure). They also found that the two atypical groups spent less
time in the zone containing the most visually stimulating objects
than did the TD children. There were no group differences on
any other measures, including locomotor activity or interacting
with the objects themselves. These data therefore suggest that
the nature of objects can affect whether or not children with
ASD seek to explore them, although less time was generally spent
visually exploring the environment. Critically, however, there was
no difference between autistic children and those with Down
syndrome on any of these measures, suggesting that these factors
are not specific to the ASD profile.
ROUTES AND MAPS
The basic exploration tasks described above were unconstrained
by task. In contrast, much of our daily navigational experience
concerns learning an environment in order to interact with it
more efficiently in future, or to find a particular object or location.
This learning may take place by means of egocentric route-based
interaction with the space, or by inspecting an allocentric survey-
like map. A study conducted by Caron et al. (2004) sought to
examine whether people with autism would demonstrate a supe-
riority in learning spatial layout; a hypothesis that was predicated
on previous demonstrations of visuospatial peaks in laboratory
tasks. They conducted a series of experiments on a cohort of 16
high-functioning participants with an ASD (mean age: 18 years),
and a control group of 16 TD individuals matched on chrono-
logical age, VIQ, PIQ, and full-scale IQ (measured by either the
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WAIS or WISC). Each of the tasks involved the same indoor maze
environment, which was constructed of plain walls that were taller
than the participants, and which was diffusely lit. The tasks were
conducted in the same order for each participant, and in the first
they were required to learn routes through the maze. The routes
differed in complexity on the basis of overall length, the number
of turns, and the number of decision points (i.e., junctions at
which the walker must make a navigational decision). Participants
were led along the route by an experimenter and were then taken
back to the start of the route and required to retrace their steps
for five successive iterations (note: the paper is unclear on how
participants were returned to the start of the route). Participant
responses were recorded by the experimenter walking behind
them, and any incorrect turns at decision points were announced
by the experimenter soon afterward (participants were then told
to return to the junction and were shown the correct turn). In
this task there were found to be no group differences—both ASD
participants and controls took more time to learn the route and
made more errors as complexity increased. Furthermore, both
groups appeared to learn the route at the same rate. In the second
task, participants were required to reverse the route that they had
learnt. This was assessed on the final response trial of the first task,
whereupon participants were required to reverse the route back
to the start point (i.e., there was one trial measuring this). Again
there were no group differences, whilst time and errors increased
with the complexity of the route.
In the third task, Caron et al. (2004) were interested in whether
participants could point to unseen parts of the route, providing
measures of survey knowledge and egocentric orientation within
that representation. Participants were led along four routes of
increasing complexity, and at the end of each they were asked
to point to the start point (which was not visible from the end
point). Angular accuracy of the pointing response was measured
by the experimenter, and although the ASD participants tended
to be more inaccurate than TD controls, there was no statistically
significant difference between groups. The next tasks directly
assessed the production of maps based on route experience, and
participants were first required to learn a path through the maze.
They were then asked to recall the route on a sheet containing
a matrix of dots (free recall), and on a sheet reproducing the
walls of the maze (cued recall). The free recall reproductions were
qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed, revealing no significant
difference between groups on accuracy or speed of reproduction
(after an adjustment for speed/accuracy trade-off was made). In
the cued recall task, reproductions were simply marked as pass
or fail, depending on whether there was an error at a decision
point. On this measure, the ASD group were shown to be more
successful than the TD group, although there was no difference in
drawing time.
The final task from the Caron et al. (2004) study was a test of
whether participants could reproduce a route in the maze that had
been learned from a map. They were given a maximum of 2 min
to study a route on a small-scale map of the maze and were then
provided with one opportunity to reproduce it within the maze
itself. The authors found that both groups produced a comparable
number of errors in the route, and executed it in a similar time.
However, after an adjustment for speed-accuracy trade-off, it was
found that the ASD group required less time to study the map.
Overall, the data from this study therefore suggest that there are
no differences between TD and ASD groups across a number of
navigational tasks. However, on two components of the study that
required the use of maps, participants with ASD were found to
perform differently to the TD group: they were more accurate at
the cued recall task of a route, and spent less time memorizing a
route that was to be later reproduced. The authors argue that this
was indicative of superior spatial skills in individuals with autism,
although it must be noted that both of the measures that showed
a group difference were scored very coarsely.
SUMMARY
On the basis of the evidence presented in this review, there appears
to be a somewhat heterogeneous picture of navigational process-
ing in ASD. There are a number of tasks that have revealed no
significant differences in navigational skills between autistic par-
ticipants and controls—these skills include elements of path inte-
gration, route learning, and simple place learning. There are also
a number of tasks that have revealed autistic strengths, compared
to TD performance: participants with ASD have demonstrated
superiority for perceptual distance matching, cued recall of routes
on a map, and encoding of route information from a map.
However, there are also data that show a number of navigational
impairments in ASD: autistic groups were slower at learning
spatial regularities, less efficient in their foraging behavior, less
able to learn locations based on allocentric representations, less
likely to sufficiently explore an environment, and more likely to
revisit locations that they have already explored.
This overall picture does not accord with the predictions of
theorists such as Reser (2011) and Baron-Cohen (2008), who
have both stated that people with autism demonstrate supe-
rior abilities exploring their environment. Indeed, much of the
evidence presented here is directly counter to those arguments:
people with autism in fact seem to be less likely to engage in
exploratory activity, and that which they do produce appears
to be restricted and inefficient. On the basis of superior per-
formance in small-scale laboratory tasks, Caron et al. (2004)
also predicted that ASD would be associated with superior nav-
igational skills, and although they mostly found an absence of
group effects, their theoretical position seemed unchanged in
their report. It is certainly the case that they found significant
effects in favor of autistic strengths for map-drawing and map-
reading tasks. However, it is interesting to note that both of
these measures were not directly based on large-scale navigational
behavior. Rather, one was based on a drawing measure and
the other was on time spent encoding route details on a map.
Furthermore, the only other autistic superiority that has been
reported in this literature is for perceptual matching of distance
information (Giovannini et al., 2009). It is therefore arguable
that the autistic strengths that have been demonstrated are within
either a small-scale visuospatial domain, or a large-scale percep-
tual domain. In contrast, those data that have been based on
large-scale visuospatial and visuomotor behavior (perhaps the
sine qua non of navigation) have either shown no difference
between groups, or have indicated notable impairments in autistic
behavior.
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology January 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 31 | 6
Smith Spatial navigation in autism spectrum disorders
REMAINING CHALLENGES
With these distinctions in mind, it seems that we must meet some
remaining challenges before we can claim to have provided a
comprehensive account of spatial navigational behavior in autism.
The first is to appreciate the full complexity of the problem—
navigational behavior is supported by a wide variety of processes
that rely on perceptual, motor, and cognitive systems (for discus-
sion, see Wolbers and Hegarty, 2010). Variability in navigational
skill can therefore originate at a number of different stages, and
from a number of different sources. As such, proficiency (or even
superiority) in one component process may not necessarily lead to
proficiency elsewhere, and performance may also be attenuated by
other processes that are relatively weaker. So for example, whilst
autistic strengths in attending to detail (e.g., Shah and Frith, 1993)
may favor the encoding of map information, deficits in imaginal
viewpoint rotation (e.g., Pearson et al., 2013) may adversely
affect the ability to describe a route. With an appreciation of the
size of the problem, researchers will be less likely to make the
assumption that behaviors observed in one context or spatial scale
will necessarily transpose to another (e.g., Montello, 1993; Smith
et al., 2010).
A second related challenge is for autism researchers to inves-
tigate navigation with a greater awareness of the wider research
that has been conducted on the topic. Owing to its behav-
ioral significance, navigation has been studied in many subject
fields and by using many techniques and populations—whilst it
might be difficult to incorporate them all into one’s thinking,
it is important to bear this breadth in mind. For instance, the
neuroscience literature contains many mouse models of autistic
behavior (e.g., Crawley, 2007; Moy et al., 2007), and yet human
studies of navigation in ASD often take place with the participant
sat at a computer monitor. It would therefore be of great benefit
to conduct more translational research that attempts to create
some sort of parity across the behaviors tested. Autism research
could also benefit from a greater awareness of the navigational
research that has been conducted in neurological patients and
other developmental disorders. Neuropsychological studies of
topographical disorientation have revealed a taxonomy of differ-
ent navigational deficits (see Aguirre and D’Esposito, 1999), and
it would be of great utility to explore the presence or absence
of these component processes in ASD. Equally, research into
navigational impairments in Williams Syndrome (a condition
that shares a number of features with ASD) provides a range of
techniques and findings that can be adopted by autism researchers
(for a real world example see; Farran et al., 2010). On the other
hand, studies of ASD navigation also need to take into account the
research that is lacking. Unlike many other behavioral processes,
developmental assays of navigation are rarely conducted with
reference to existing models of navigational development, and
those models that do exist (Siegel and White, 1975; Golledge
et al., 1985) are rather underspecified in the light of more
recent knowledge. This situation will be improved if scientists
can explicitly frame their work within the context of navigation
research.
Finally, aspects of autism research present more general scien-
tific challenges that must be overcome before we can conscionably
make big claims about navigation in ASD. First, as is evident
from the participant details included in this review, there is
great variability in the chronological ages, sample sizes, matching
criteria, and intellectual level of the participants tested in these
studies. This means that ASD cohorts are being compared to a
variety of control groups, and themselves represent a variety of
ages and ability levels. At the same time, we are applying much
of this thinking to a relatively restricted portion of the autism
spectrum—i.e., the high functioning individuals that are able to
take part in the tasks that we devise. This means that we must
be careful when extrapolating behavior to that of the broader
spectrum (for an insightful discussion of this topic see; Simmons
et al., 2009). Second, one could argue that autism research has
been particularly dogged by a desire to create grand theories that
account for all aspects of the disorder. This has been a definite
product of the cognitive revolution, and the literature is replete
with competing accounts of the condition that have all made
an appearance in a relatively short space of time. The persua-
siveness and ubiquity of these accounts may have constrained
research questions, with scientists attempting to account for a
variety of behaviors within artificially constrained frameworks.
Navigational abilities have been inaccurately represented by grand
theories of autism and we should therefore take a more careful
and measured approach when attempting to characterize a very
complex and multi-faceted set of behaviors within a very complex
and multi-faceted population.
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